Red Flag: Air Combat for the 21st Century (Military Power)
September 11, Using precision-guided munitions, U. October 13, Capt. Jeffrey S. November 22, A B—52 was hit by a surface-to-air missile while on a mission over North Vietnam, becoming the first Stratofortress lost to enemy action. The crew members ejected over Thailand, where they were rescued.
Air combat terms
December 18, President Richard M. Samuel O. January 8, Capt.
Paul D. Lawrence W. This operation had continued since The operation concluded on April 9. Jeanne M. Richard I. Borda, assistant secretary of the Air Force, and Gen.
January 13, Dr. John L. McLucas, secretary of the Air Force, authorized purchase of the General Dynamics F—16—a low-cost, lightweight, highly maneuverable aircraft. Communist forces had completely cut land routes between this coastal provincial city and the rest of the country. Miraculously, of the people on board survived the accident.
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The city fell on April 17 to the Khmer Rouge. The helicopters airlifted more than 6, evacuees from the South Vietnamese capital in two days. May 12, Cambodian gunboats seized the U. In response, Military Airlift Command transported U. May 15, Cambodia returned the Mayaguez crew after marines, supported by USAF helicopters and A—7 aircraft, captured the empty ship and assaulted Koh Tang Island, where the crew was mistakenly thought to have been taken. Robert W.
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Undorf received the Mackay Trophy for conspicuous gallantry, initiative, and resourcefulness during this military operation—the last major American military action in Southeast Asia. September 1, Gen.
The F—15 was the first fighter to have a thrust greater than its weight, allowing it to accelerate while going straight up. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the F—15 Eagle served the Air Force as its premier air-superiority aircraft. The heavily armored jet attack aircraft, armed with a heavy Gatling gun in the nose and equipped with straight wings able to carry a variety of air-to-ground munitions, was designed for close air support missions.
June 28, Joan Olsen became the first woman cadet to enter the Air Force Academy and the first woman to enter any of the three Department of Defense service academies. Japanese and U. September 29, The first of two groups of 10 women pilot candidates entered undergraduate pilot training at Williams Air Force Base, Arizona—the first time since World War II that women could train to become pilots of U.
Equipped with in-flight refueling capability, it was June 19, A C—5 Galaxy flew nonstop from Chicago to Moscow carrying a ton superconducting magnet, the first time a C—5 had ever landed in the Soviet Union. The flight of 5, nautical miles required two aerial refuelings. June 30, President James E. Yet, up to that time, the Air Force had conducted almost all air combat maneuver training by matching identical aircraft-F-4 against F Not only that, but USAF's training exercises usually featured duels between fighter aircraft from the same squadron.
The F-4 was a big, highly capable aircraft-but it had not been designed specifically for the air superiority role. It could do many missions well. However, it was large and unwieldy, it provided relatively poor visibility to the pilot, and it was saddled with flight envelope limitations that undercut its effectiveness in the air superiority role. John Boyd's concept of aerial maneuverability, USAF could overcome the opposition with the E's greater relative strength in certain parts of the combat envelope. That took a while, though. Moreover, USAF aircraft were equipped with Sidewinder and Sparrow missiles designed to strike at bombers, not fighters that were engaging in high-g combat maneuvers.
For their part, USAF pilots were inhibited by rules of engagement requiring visual identification of the enemy and thus ensuring that air combat would occur at close ranges, where gun armament had an edge over missiles. Experienced leaders helped pilots cope with such disadvantages but at the cost of intensive in-theater training and combat losses. Soon, the failure of USAF's peacetime training approach became only too apparent.
The exchange ratio in the best of times was no better than 2-to-1 and, at the lowest, actually fell to under the break-even 1-to-1 level. The study demonstrated three sobering facts about USAF aircrews:. The problems became especially acute whenever pilots with relatively little fighter experience rotated into the cockpit. As a result, the service during the war considered various proposals to change the training system. However, they were not thought to be feasible. The pressure to get pilots through the pipeline and into combat operations was so great that USAF had no assets to begin new programs.
One change, of course, concerned the service's main air fighting instrument--the fighter aircraft itself. Problems with the jack-of-all-trades F-4 generated the drive to produce the specialized F air superiority fighter. Just as important, however, was the renewed emphasis on training the human beings who had been shown in the Red Baron study to be poorly prepared for battle. Red Flag did not come into being fully formed.
It derived from a series of ideas from different people over many years.
In , Vol. The publication was dedicated to "spreading the gunnery gospel. Frederick C. In the March issue, an article noted a change in Tactical Air Command procedures calling for training in dissimilar aircraft. For many years, the idea of an "aggressor" squadron germinated. Taylor saw that the huge area surrounding Nellis would be ideal for an aerial training range of mammoth proportions, ultimately reaching 12, square miles. Meanwhile, things were happening back in Washington, D. In the Pentagon's basement, in the electronic combat directorate, Col.
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Kirk had some majors working for him, and they knew that among the problems was the need for more rigorous training. John A. He thought these could be used to provide realistic air combat maneuvering training. As desirable as this might have been, there were too many administrative problems in the way, and the project was shelved. But Corder was soon joined by two other officers who would be heard from in years to come-Maj.
Richard Moody Suter and Lt. Charles A. John D. Ryan, the then-Chief of Staff, had become dissatisfied with the loss rate in Vietnam and accuracy of bomb delivery. He approved a proposal made by Kirk and Corder that recommended, among other things, the formation of an air-to-air aggressor squadron. Horner then advanced the idea of using excess Northrop T Talons for the new unit.
He proposed that fighter squadrons rotate through Nellis to train with the aggressors and that the aggressors would go out to "visit" squadrons in the field. These small supersonic aircraft were used to simulate the MiG in air combat maneuvers. The resulting exercises were deemed to be so useful that the Air Force fashioned a second squadron-the 65th FWS-at Nellis and two more for overseas training. In the meantime, Moody Suter, who had been a strong proponent of the aggressor squadron concept and had worked out the training program at Nellis, was visualizing a large-scale combat training operation going beyond mere air-to-air combat maneuvering.
A charismatic if sometimes contentious figure, Suter elaborated on Corder's and Horner's original work with air-to-air aggressors to create a briefing that outlined the basic concepts of what would become Red Flag. He saw it from the start as a means of improving and extending the ability of Air Force integrated strike packages to get to their targets with maximum accuracy and minimum losses.
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Suter was once described as a man who performed systems management before systems management was invented. He had the ability to visualize operations on a grand scale and know exactly what would be required-not only of the fighter force but also of all the supporting elements. This desire was certainly justified. In , USAF lost aircraft. The figure dropped to in and in as a result of adherence to rigorous safety guidelines. No one in the Air Force wanted the numbers to rise, yet the emphasis on safety made a mockery of air combat training.
Training missions had become standardized, with as much emphasis on filling squares on paper as putting bombs on target. Suter knew of studies demonstrating that the majority of combat losses occur during a pilot's first 10 combat missions. After that point, losses dropped nearly to zero. Suter argued for the creation of a training environment so realistic that a new pilot would log his first 10 "combat" missions in a controlled environment. The idea was that when he went into actual combat, the pilot would have "survived" his most vulnerable period.
Suter acknowledged that realistic training, no matter how carefully controlled, could result in accidents. His argument was that the acceptance of a few losses in training would prevent large-scale losses in combat. In essence, Red Flag was to teach pilots how to adapt quickly to combat and show them what would happen to them if they did not.